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 Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Green, Members of the Committee: I thank you 
for the opportunity to express my views about these bank settlements and whether they 
circumvent Congress‘s appropriations powers. 
 
The Appropriations Clause in Constitutional Context 
 
 The Constitution provides: ―No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .‖ 1  This is not a mere technical 
provision but rather a fundamental element of constitutional structure.   
 
 It sounds, first, in democracy, reflecting the deep constitutional principle that the 
power of the purse should be vested in the most representative branch.  Every dollar 
appropriated from the Treasury may represent a dollar of taxes, and so this principle 
applies to both taxing and spending.  Indeed, the taxing and spending powers are the first 
ones granted to Congress in Article I, section 8, and the first runs directly into the second: 
―The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, 
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States . . . .‖2  Taxing and spending are the twin powers of the purse, and ―[t]he 
legislature . . . commands the purse.‖3  Moreover, the House of Representatives is vested 
with a special role over revenues: ―All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives . . . .‖4  And the reason is clear: House Members are ―more 
                                                          
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
2 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
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immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought 
to hold the purse-strings.‖5  
 
 The structural role of the Appropriations Clause sounds not only in democracy but 
also in separation of powers.  Short of impeachment, the power of the purse is Congress‘s 
most potent check on executive overreach.  If the President could draw money from the 
Treasury without an appropriation—or otherwise evade the Appropriations Clause—
power would shift decisively from Congress to the Executive, and the careful 
constitutional separation of powers would be thrown into disequilibrium.  So, as 
Alexander Hamilton explained, the Executive Branch is limited to ―application and 
disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the 
legislature.‖6 
 
 The Framers placed great stock in the appropriations power as a check on the 
Executive Branch, because, in Great Britain, it had proven so effective for restraining the 
king.  As James Madison explained: 
 
The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they 
alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of 
government.  They, in a word, hold the purse—that 
powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of 
the British Constitution, an infant and humble 
representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere 
of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far 
as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives 
of the other branches of the government.  This power over 
the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete 
and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm 
the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a 
redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect 
every just and salutary measure.7 
 
 To see just how essential is this check on executive power, consider some of the 
other major congressional checks on executive power, and how they have fared in the 
current Administration.  As a general matter, the President cannot appoint principal 
officers without the advice and consent of the Senate.8  But, as the Supreme Court 
                                                          
5 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 233 (Max Ferrand ed., Yale 
Univ. Press 1911) (June 13, 1787) (statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison). 
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (―[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as 
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unanimously held, President Obama violated this provision by attempting recess 
appointments when the Senate itself said that it was not in recess.9  As a general matter, 
the President cannot wage war without a congressional authorization to use military 
force.10  Yet this President has waged war against ISIS for almost two years without 
one.11  Treaties require the advice and consent of the Senate,12 yet this President has 
entered into the most consequential international agreement in recent memory without 
going through the treaty process.13  The President is obliged to ―take Care that the Laws 
                                                                                                                                                                             
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.‖). 
9 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); see also Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Linda Greenhouse and Noel Canning, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 7, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/07/linda-
greenhouse-on-noel-canning/.  
10 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (―The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War, 
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and 
Water . . . .‖); see also War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012) 
(requiring the President to report to Congress the introduction of armed forces into 
hostilities, and to terminate the use of armed forces if Congress does not authorize such 
use within sixty days). 
11 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The War Against ISIS Is Unconstitutional, LAWFARE (May 
5, 2016, 2:10 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/war-against-isis-unconstitutional; Jack 
Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion of a President’s Power to Make War, TIME 
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/ (―[Future 
historians] will puzzle over how Barack Obama the prudent war-powers constitutionalist 
transformed into a matchless war-powers unilateralist.  And they will wonder why he 
claimed to ‗welcome congressional support‘ for his new military initiative against the 
Islamic State but did not insist on it in order to ensure clear political and legal legitimacy 
for the tough battle that promised to consume his last two years in office and define his 
presidency. . . .  [Obama's] announcement that he will expand the use of military force 
against the Islamic State without the need for new congressional consent marks his latest 
adventure in unilateralism and cements an astonishing legacy of expanding presidential 
war powers. . . .  The President's gambit is, at bottom, presidential unilateralism 
masquerading as implausible statutory interpretation.‖). 
12 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (―[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur . . . .‖). 
13 See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, How Obama Swindled Americans on Iran, NATIONAL 
REVIEW (Sept. 10, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/423845/how-
obama-swindled-americans-iran-charles-krauthammer (―As a matter of constitutional 
decency, the president should have submitted [the Iran deal] to Congress first.  And 
submitted it as a treaty.  Which it obviously is.  No international agreement in a 
generation matches this one in strategic significance and geopolitical gravity.‖); David B. 
Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Lawless Underpinnings of the Iran Nuclear Deal, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 26, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
lawless-underpinnings-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal-1437949928.  
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be faithfully executed,‖14 but I have testified before the House Judiciary Committee that 
President Obama has flouted his obligation to enforce the immigration laws,15 and Texas 
just last month presented the same argument to the Supreme Court.16  
 
 It is in this context that the Appropriations Clause question arises.  A willful 
President may evade many of the constitutional checks on his power.  But Congress‘s 
appropriations power is the ultimate backstop.  The constitutional rule is clear, and 
explicit, and absolute: ―No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence 
of Appropriations made by Law . . . .‖17  Everything that government does costs money, 
and so the power of the purse should successfully constrain the executive branch even if 
all else fails.  Moreover, all negotiations between the President and Congress—even 
those that have nothing to do with appropriations—happen in the shadow of this 
fundamental power.  ―Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the 
body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most 
essential functions.‖18  At the end of the day, the President knows that Congress holds the 
purse strings, and every choice he makes is implicitly informed by this crucial structural 
fact. 
 
 Alas, a determined President may flout this provision too.  Just last week, District 
Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found 
that the Administration has paid billions of dollars to insurance companies under 
ObamaCare without an appropriation from Congress.  She held, in no uncertain terms, 
that making these payments ―without an appropriation . . . violates the Constitution.‖19 
 
Bank Settlement Payments To “Community Development” Organizations 
 
 Under these circumstances, then, it is fair to view certain provisions of these bank 
settlements with a skeptical eye.  The provisions at issue provide for payments from the 
banks to various third-party organizations that were neither parties to the case nor victims 
of the alleged wrongdoing.20  Many of these ―community development‖ organizations 
seem to have only a tenuous connection to the gravamen of the complaint against the 
banks.  Yet the banks are to make payments directly to these organizations—payments 
that presumably could have been directed to the U.S. Treasury instead. 
                                                          
14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
15 See The President’s Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 26–32 (2013) (testimony and 
prepared statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center and Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute). 
16 See United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (S. Ct. argued Apr. 18, 2016). 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton). 
19 House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967, 2016 WL 2750934, at *7 (D.D.C. 
May 12, 2016). 
20 See, e.g., Holder Cut Left-Wing Groups in on $17 Bil BoA Deal, INVESTOR‘S BUSINESS 
DAILY (Aug. 27, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/holders-
bank-of-america-settlement-includes-payoffs-to-democrat-groups/.  
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 These payments admittedly do not violate the literal terms of the Appropriations 
Clause.  The Clause provides: ―No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .‖21  Under the settlement provisions at 
issue, funds are paid directly from the banks to the third-party organizations.  These funds 
were never actually in the Treasury, and so they are not literally ―drawn from the 
Treasury‖ under the Appropriations Clause. 
 
 But if these provisions do not literally violate the Appropriations Clause, it is 
certainly fair to say that they circumvent the Clause.  If the banks had paid this money to 
the United States—which is, after all, the plaintiff in these cases—then the money would 
have gone into the Treasury.  And if, subsequently, the President or the Attorney General 
favored using this money to subsidize various ―community development‖ organizations, 
they would have had to request an appropriation from Congress; doling out such money 
―without an appropriation . . . violates the Constitution,‖22 as the President was reminded 
just last week.  By providing for direct payment from the banks to the organizations, 
these settlement provisions evade the Appropriations Clause and cut Congress out of the 
loop.   
 
 Another way to put the point is that these settlement provisions embody two 
implicit decisions.  The first is the value of the government‘s claims against the banks: 
the predicted damages at trial, discounted by the odds of a verdict for the government.  
The responsibility to make this judgment inheres in the Attorney General‘s litigation 
authority,23 and it is well within the expertise of the Department of Justice.  The second 
implicit decision is the best possible use of these funds—whether to subsidize insurance 
companies under ObamaCare,24 to subsidize various ―community development‖ 
organizations, to pay down the $19,000,000,000,000 national debt, or to do any number 
of other things.  This second decision is paradigmatically legislative, and it is exactly the 
sort of decision that the Appropriations Clause reserves to Congress.  If the funds were 
first paid into the Treasury and then appropriated out again, these two decisions would be 
separated: the Attorney General would make the first and Congress would make the 
second.  But by providing for direct payment from the banks to third-party organizations, 
the Administration effectively combined these two decisions and arrogated them both to 
itself.  
 
 Again, the structural role of the Appropriations Clause sounds in democracy 
(ensuring that spending decisions are made by the most representative branch) and in 
separation of powers (as a fundamental backstop against an overreaching executive 
branch).  These settlement provisions evade the Appropriations Clause and thus subvert 
                                                          
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
22 House of Representatives, 2016 WL 2750934, at *7. 
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (granting the Attorney General authority over ―the conduct 
of litigation‖ for the United States); Compromise of Claims Under Sections 3469 and 
3229 of the Revised Statutes—Power of the Attorney General in Matters of Compromise, 
38 Op. Att‘y Gen. 98 (1934). 
24 Cf. House of Representatives, 2016 WL 2750934. 
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these structural principles.  
 
Settlement Payments Contingent on Subsequent Acts of Congress     
 
 Finally, it should be noted that at least one of these settlement provisions includes 
an additional problematic feature.  Under the Bank of America Settlement Agreement, 
certain funds are designated for ―the payment of consumer tax liability as a result of 
consumer relief‖25 unless and until, inter alia, ―any extension to the Mortgage 
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 or its equivalent becomes effective through the end 
of 2015,‖26 at which point remaining designated funds would go to NeighborWorks 
America and IOLTA.27  This provision is doubly problematic, because it is contingent on 
a future Act of Congress, and it thus has the pernicious effect of changing the political 
calculus for extending the Act.  
 
 The altered incentives would affect different actors in different ways.  Taxpayers 
who would otherwise stand to gain from extension of the Act are made indifferent to it, 
because their taxes will be paid by Bank of America in any case.  Conversely, IOLTA, 
which might otherwise have no particular interest in the Mortgage Debt Relief Act, 
suddenly stands to gain tens of millions of dollars from its extension.  And for Congress 
itself, an appropriation that is ostensibly for taxpayer relief is partially converted, in 
effect, into an appropriation for IOLTA and NeighborWorks.   
 
 Quite apart from the evasion of the Appropriations Clause, it is arguably a violation 
of the separation of powers for the Executive Branch to attach either a ―tax‖ or a ―bonus‖ 
to a legislative act in this way.  To see the point, imagine a settlement provision that 
required the Bank of America to pay an additional $100 million to NeighborWorks if the 
Senate fails to confirm Merrick Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Presumably, the 
President cannot impose this sort of ―tax‖ on an exclusive Senate prerogative, any more 
than Congress can ―tax‖ presidential pardons.28  Above and beyond the Appropriations 
Clause problem, a settlement payment that is contingent on a future Act of Congress 
would seem to run afoul of this separation-of-powers principle. 
 
Conclusion    
                                                          
25 Settlement Agreement Between Bank of America and the United States, DEP‘T OF 
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3392014829141150385241.pdf (last 
visited May 19, 2016). 
26 Settlement Agreement Between Bank of America and the United States: Annex 3, DEP‘T 
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/4922014829141329620708.pdf 
(last visited May 19, 2016). 
27 See id. 
28 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147–48 (1871) (―It is the intention of the 
Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the government—the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial—shall be, in its sphere, independent of the 
others.  To the executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without 
limit. . . .  Now it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon 
any more than the executive can change a law.‖). 
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 In short, these settlement provisions do not violate the literal terms of the 
Appropriations Clause, but they clearly circumvent its text and subvert its function, thus 
undermining the separation of powers.  Congress has often found it necessary to protect 
against circumventions of this Clause, and it has done so with landmark legislation like 
the Antideficiency Act29 and the Miscellaneous Receipts Act.30  The novel innovation in 
these settlement agreements likewise necessitates a legislative response.  I would support 
legislation along the lines of the proposed Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016, and 
I would be happy to work with the Committee to further refine this bill. 
                                                          
29 The Antideficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 97–258, 96 Stat. 923 (1982). 
30 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2012). 
